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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant, Robert D. Schulman ("Schulman"), t/a Maxi's 
Express ("Maxi's"), appeals an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting 
summary judgment in favor of appellees, J.P. Morgan Investment 
Management, Inc. ("J.P. Morgan") and Widener Funding Corporation, 
Inc. ("Widener") (collectively "mortgagee"), on Schulman's claim 
that the mortgagee intentionally interfered with contractual 
relations between him, as tenant of a commercial building, and 
Widener Associates Limited Partnership ("WALP"), the landlord.1 
The order also granted summary judgment to the mortgagee on its 
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that no valid, 
enforceable lease existed. 
 For the reasons that follow, we hold the district court 
had subject matter jurisdiction over the question raised in 
Count I of Schulman's complaint and the portion of J.P. Morgan's 
amended pleading styled as a counterclaim despite WALP's absence 
                     
1.  WALP is not a party to this action. 
 
 
as a party.  On the merits of that issue, we conclude that the 
district court correctly determined there was no existing lease 
with which the mortgagee could have tortiously interfered.  No 
lease existed between WALP and Schulman because the draft leases 
on which all of the negotiations between Schulman and WALP were 
based explicitly required execution by the landlord, an event 
that never happened.  In addition, even if we assume Schulman had 
a reasonable probability of obtaining a lease absent J.P. 
Morgan's and Widener's interference, Schulman's alternate claim 
for interference with a prospective contractual relation between 
himself and WALP fails as a matter of law because Morgan and 
Widener were acting in good faith to protect their legal and 
financial interests as mortgagee of the premises Schulman sought 
to lease from WALP.  Accordingly, we will affirm the district 
court's order in all respects. 
 
 I. 
 In 1990 WALP, the owner of the Widener Building in 
Philadelphia, began a major renovation of the building to attract 
upscale tenants.  Jeffrey Kelter ("Kelter") was the principal 
acting on WALP's behalf regarding the renovation.2  Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of the United States ("Equitable Life") 
                     
2.  WALP's general partners include Kelter, Peter Faherty 
("Faherty") and 1339 Chestnut Street Associates.  Kelter and 
Faherty, along with Anthony Brady, are also the principal 
stockholders in FKB Management, Inc. ("FKB").  FKB manages the 
Widener Building under a management agreement with WALP dated 
July 18, 1991.  1339 Chestnut Street Associates has no 
affiliation with FKB. 
 
 
began funding the building's renovation under a construction loan 
agreement with WALP dated June 8, 1990.  The agreement included 
among other documents a Mortgage and Assignment of Leases and 
Rents, both of which were publicly recorded on June 15, 1990 
under Pennsylvania's recording laws, 21 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 321-471 (deeds), 621-28 (mortgages) (1955 & Supp. 1994). 
Equitable Life assigned these documents to Widener under an 
"Assignment of Loan Documents" which was also publicly recorded 
on July 24, 1990.  As recited in the Mortgage, WALP and Widener 
also executed a Permanent Loan Agreement dated June 8, 1990 in 
which Widener agreed to loan WALP up to $72 million for 
renovations, including a take-out of Equitable Life's 
construction financing.  Both the Assignment of Leases and the 
Permanent Loan Agreement provided WALP would not lease any part 
of the building without the prior written consent of Widener, the 
assignee. 
 As of April 1, 1992, Widener had loaned WALP 
approximately $63 million to finance the renovations.  Anne 
Pfeiffer, Vice President of both Widener and J.P. Morgan,3 
supervised the loan and was responsible for approving new leases 
on Widener's behalf.4 
                     
3.  J.P. Morgan acts as a trustee for a commingled pension trust 
fund and invests monies which come from over 157 domestic pension 
and employee benefit funds.  J.P. Morgan, as trustee, wholly owns 
Widener which it formed for the sole purpose of providing 
financing to WALP. 
4.  Pfeiffer stated in her affidavit that typically her approval 
of a lease was not sought until the lease was signed by the 
prospective tenant.  Once she approved the lease on behalf of 
Widener, the lease was executed by WALP as landlord. 
 
 
 In the summer of 1990 Kelter and Schulman began 
discussing plans for Schulman to operate Maxi's, a food 
establishment in the lobby of the Widener Building.5  It is 
undisputed that both Kelter and Schulman anticipated that a lease 
would be executed for Schulman's establishment at some later 
date.  Under the construction arrangement, the tenants received 
the first year's rent free of charge, which in Schulman's case 
amounted to $56,280.  Schulman agreed to "contribute" this amount 
personally to Kelter for construction and obtained an offsetting 
construction allowance from Kelter.   Schulman invested an 
additional $35,000 towards construction costs. 
 Kelter participated in and approved the design plans 
for Maxi's before construction began and forwarded them to 
Pfeiffer.  According to Schulman, Kelter told him that he alone 
made decisions concerning the premises to be leased and that he 
never told Schulman that Widener and J.P. Morgan had to approve 
the lease.  Schulman admits, however, that he knew Pfeiffer was 
connected with the lender and that she wanted to review the draft 
leases prior to execution.  Construction began in September of 
1991 despite the fact no lease had yet been signed. 
 Kelter sent Schulman three draft leases dated June 4, 
1990, March 19, 1991 and August 6, 1991 respectively prior to 
commencing construction.  Schulman reviewed these drafts himself 
and his counsel, Martin Herring & Associates and later Drinker, 
                     
5.  Kelter allegedly advised Schulman that Maxi's had to be 
"absolutely first-class" because the renovations were aimed at 
obtaining first class tenants, but Schulman disputes this fact. 
 
 
Biddle & Reath, also reviewed at least two of the drafts.  
Schulman noted several objections on the drafts, some of which 
were incorporated into subsequent drafts.  According to Schulman, 
the third draft lease dated August 6, 1991, set forth all of the 
material agreed-upon terms.  Schulman never objected to a 
provision appearing in all of the draft leases that expressly 
required WALP's approval and signature, as well as delivery of a 
fully executed lease, before any binding lease agreement would 
arise. 
 As construction continued, Schulman repeatedly tried to 
obtain an executed lease.  Kelter reassured him each time that 
Schulman had a lease and had nothing to worry about.  Though 
neither WALP nor Widener executed any of the draft leases, 
Schulman contends that a ten-year lease for the premises 
commenced in October or November 1991 when Schulman began 
construction of his establishment and the terms of this lease, 
agreed upon by August 6, 1991, are embodied in a fourth draft 
dated January 31, 1992 which FKB sent to Schulman on February 4, 
1992. 
 Maxi's opened for business on December 2, 1991 despite 
the absence of an executed lease.  After the renovated Widener 
Building's official grand opening celebration on December 12, 
1991, Pfeiffer told Kelter she did not like Maxi's appearance and 
called it her "worst nightmare."  Appendix to Brief of Robert D. 
Schulman ("App.") at A-91.  Shortly thereafter, according to 
Schulman, Kelter began, for the first time, to express 
displeasure about Maxi's aesthetics and appearance and suggested 
 
 
physical and operational improvements.6  Schulman agreed to the 
suggestions but could not implement them because of a lack of 
sufficient funds.  Kelter agreed to provide funding for the 
improvements but never did so. 
 On February 3, 1992, FKB employee Stephen Butte sent 
Schulman a letter confirming the amount of rent he now owed 
"pursuant to the terms of your lease."  App. at A-200.  On 
February 4, 1992, another FKB employee, Jennifer Pancoast, sent 
Schulman a second letter enclosing three "approved execution 
copies of the Lease Agreement for your space at The Widener 
Building."  App. at A-97. 
 In March of 1992 Kelter told Schulman he had no lease 
and ordered him to vacate the premises.  Kelter offered to 
compensate Schulman for his out-of-pocket expenses and prior rent 
checks.  Schulman refused the offer.  WALP filed suit for 
ejectment in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on May 18, 
1992.7  Kelter also moved for a preliminary injunction.  After 
four days of hearings, Kelter abandoned that motion. 
                     
6.  According to Schulman, he learned the reason for Kelter's 
change of heart and growing displeasure with Maxi's only after 
Pfeiffer testified in state court on April 29, 1992 in support of 
WALP's motion for a preliminary injunction against Schulman.    
Schulman complains Pfeiffer was well aware of the construction 
and design plans for Maxi's long before its opening because she 
had received at least one draft of the lease in June 1991 as well 
as the architect's final design plans.  She also visited the 
construction site on several occasions, one as late as November 
of 1991.  At no time did she question Schulman's design for 
Maxi's.  She states she never really examined the establishment 
until December 12, 1991. 
7.  The ejectment action remains pending in state court. 
 
 
 In May of 1992 Schulman filed a complaint in the 
district court against J.P. Morgan and Widener alleging 
intentional interference with existing or prospective contractual 
relations.  On January 19, 1993, J.P. Morgan and Widener moved to 
amend their answer to include what they called a counterclaim for 
a declaratory judgment that Schulman did not have a valid, 
enforceable lease.  Ten days later they moved for summary 
judgment and sanctions. 
 On April 22, 1993, the district court granted J.P. 
Morgan's and Widener's motions to amend their answer and also 
concluded WALP was not an indispensable party on the counterclaim 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.  On August 19, 1993, 
the court granted the mortgagee's motion for summary judgment 
against Schulman on all claims, including the so-called 
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment, but declined to impose 
sanctions.  In its opinion the district court held Schulman could 
not prevail on his Count I claim for intentional interference 
with an existing contract because both WALP and Widener were 
required to consent to any lease and therefore Schulman had no 
existing lease with WALP.  It also held Schulman had no 
reasonable prospect of obtaining a lease.  Alternately, the 
district court held any interference was privileged because J.P. 
Morgan and Widener, as mortgagee and assignee of the leases, had 
both a legal and financial interest in the transaction.  Finally, 
the district court declared Schulman had no valid, enforceable 






 Because Schulman is a Pennsylvania citizen while J.P. 
Morgan and Widener are New York corporations with their principal 
places of business in New York and the claimed damages exceed 
$50,000, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West 1993) when Schulman filed this case.  
We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final 
order granting summary judgment under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 
1993).  Accordingly, all facts in the record, and all reasonable 
inferences deduced therefrom, will be construed in the light most 
favorable to Schulman, the non-moving party.  Mellon Bank Corp. 
v. First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Invs., 951 F.2d 
1399, 1404 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 The district court's conclusion that WALP is not an 
indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Janney Montgomery Scott, 
Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1993).8  
We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of 
summary judgment.  Mellon, 951 F.2d 1399, 1404 (3d Cir. 1991); 
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  We also review a district court's 
decision to review or dismiss an action under the Declaratory 
                     
8.  In Janney we held a district court's determination that an 
absent party is necessary under Rule 19(a), as opposed to 
indispensable under Rule 19(b), is subject to plenary review when 
the district court's determination is premised on a conclusion of 
law.  Janney, 11 F.3d at 404.  We will assume WALP is necessary 
under Rule 19(a) as discussed infra Part III A. 
 
 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994), 
for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Pennsylvania, 
Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 923 F.2d 1071, 1073 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
 III. 
 In response to the mortgagee's motion to amend its 
answer to assert as a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment its 
argument that no lease existed, Schulman argued in the district 
court that WALP was an indispensable party because its presence 
was essential to resolving the mortgagee's counterclaim.  He also 
argued that a decision on the mortgagee's counterclaim would 
expose him to a substantial risk of inconsistent rulings if WALP 
were not joined because he would be collaterally estopped in the 
pending state court ejectment action by a declaratory judgment 
that no lease exists, but WALP would not be collaterally estopped 
if the district court decided a lease did exist. 
 The district court granted the mortgagee's motion to 
add the attack on the lease's existence that was called a 
counterclaim, expressly rejecting Schulman's contention that WALP 
was an indispensable party.  The district court first noted 
Schulman would not be prejudiced by the proposed counterclaim 
because all questions relating to the existence of Schulman's 
lease were already at issue in Schulman's own claim of 
intentional interference with contractual relations.  It also 
stated its ruling on the counterclaim would not interfere with or 




 Whether Mr. Schulman had an enforceable lease 
or not is an entirely separate question from 
the one now in state court of whether Mr. 
Schulman has any rights against the landlord.  
Moreover, my ruling need not prompt those 
parties to dispute the ruling's collateral 
estoppel effect.  If I find, after full and 
fair litigation on the merits, that there was 
no lease, Mr. Schulman cannot re-litigate 
that issue in state court.  See Parklane 
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 
(1979).  If, on the other hand, Mr. Schulman 
is concerned that the landlord will try to 
re-litigate the issue should I find there was 
a lease, he can accept the landlord's 
counsel's proposal that both Mr. Schulman and 
the landlord waive their rights to re-
litigate the existence of the lease. 
 
 
Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Investment Management, Inc., No. 
92-cv-02853 (E.D. Pa. April 22, 1993) (footnote omitted) (order 
granting motion to amend).  Finally, the district court stated 
"[w]hile the landlord may be an important witness on the issue of 
whether the requirements of a Widener Building lease were 
satisfied, he need not be a party to Schulman's suit against the 
building's lender for intentional interference."  Id. (emphasis 
in original). 
 Schulman did not argue on appeal that the district 
court's order granting the mortgagee's motion to amend its answer 
to assert a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment was 
erroneous.  Nevertheless, prior to oral argument we asked the 
parties to submit letter memoranda addressing the effect of 
WALP's non-joinder under Rule 19(b).  See Finberg v. Sullivan, 
634 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1980) (in banc) (this Court on appeal 
can raise sua sponte problem of joinder without motion of 
 
 
parties) (citing Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968)). 
 The parties assumed that the only basis for 
jurisdiction was diversity.  Therefore, in both the district 
court and here they briefed the jurisdictional issue in terms of 
the Rule 19 distinction between necessary and indispensable 
parties.  In doing so, they overlooked the possibility of 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 1993) 
that would be present if J.P. Morgan's amended pleading claiming 
that no lease exists is truly a counterclaim.  See 6 Charles A. 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1414 
at 99, 1422 at 170, 1436 at 274-76 (1990).  J.P. Morgan's claim 
that no lease exists may, however, be no more than a defense to 
Count I of Schulman's complaint, not a counterclaim.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(c) (permitting court to relabel improperly labeled 
counterclaims and defenses).  If this claim is mislabeled, 
consideration of WALP's status as a necessary or indispensable 
party under Rule 19 would be required. 
 Accordingly, whether the amended complaint's claim that 
the lease does not exist is treated as a counterclaim or a 
redundant defense is immaterial to the district court's 
jurisdiction over J.P. Morgan's contention that no lease ever 
existed.  Moreover, if it is not a redundant defense, we disagree 
with the dissent's conclusion that the district court abused its 
discretion in addressing the merits of that contention and 





 Supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367 would not 
be available if the mortgagee's attack on the existence of the 
lease that is the basis of Count I of Schulman's complaint is not 
a true counterclaim, but consideration of the merits would 
nevertheless be proper unless WALP is not an indispensable party 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b).  For the reasons 
hereinafter given, we conclude WALP is not indispensable.  
Rule 19 sets forth a two step procedure for determining whether a 
person is an indispensable party.  See Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. 
Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 895 F.2d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1990); 
Abel v. American Art Analog, Inc., 838 F.2d 691, 694-95 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Under the rule, a court must consider whether an absent 
party is "necessary" and "indispensable."  We will first consider 
whether WALP is a "necessary" party to this action. 
 Schulman argues the landlord is necessary under both 
Rule 19(a)(2)(i) and Rule 19(a)(2)(ii).9  Under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) 
                     
9.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 
 Rule 19.  Joinder of Persons Needed for Just 
Adjudication 
 
  (a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible.  A 
person . . . shall be joined as a party . . . 
if (1) in the person's absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is 
so situated that the disposition of the 
action in the person's absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede the 
person's ability to protect that interest or 
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties 
 
 
we ask whether nonjoinder would subject Schulman to a substantial 
risk of inconsistent obligations if the district court decided 
there was a lease and WALP subsequently challenged this finding 
in state court. 
 We recognize that a decision in this action on the 
mortgagee's defense to Schulman's claim for tortious interference 
denying the existence of any lease between Schulman and WALP 
could affect the pending state court action, but whether WALP 
would be collaterally estopped is ultimately a matter for the 
state court to decide when the issue arises.  Cf. Janney, 11 F.3d 
at 407 (declining "to hold that any potential effect the doctrine 
[of stare decisis] may have on an absent party's rights makes the 
absent party's joinder compulsory under Rule 19(a) whenever 
'feasible'").  Nevertheless, under general principles of 
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, a strong argument can be 
made that WALP would be bound.10  Moreover, during the district 
court proceedings WALP agreed to be bound by the district court's 
determination on the lease's existence.  We will therefore 
assume, without deciding, that WALP is a necessary party under 
(..continued) 
subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (in relevant part). 
10.  See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 27-29 (1982).  
WALP's interests are the same as the mortgagee and the mortgagee 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue as well as 
every incentive to press its defense that no lease ever arose. 
 
 
Rule 19(a) and go on to consider whether it is also indispensable 
under Rule 19(b). 
 
 B. 
 The extent to which a judgment rendered in WALP's 
absence might be prejudicial to it or to those already parties to 
this case must be considered under Rule 19(b) as well as 19(a).11  
Prejudice under Rule 19(b), like impairment of an absent party's 
rights under Rule 19(a)(2)(i), implicates principles of 
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.  Under Pennsylvania law 
                     
11.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) provides: 
 
 (b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder 
not Feasible.  If a person as described in 
subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made 
a party, the court shall determine whether in 
equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or 
should be dismissed, the absent person being 
thus regarded as indispensable.  The factors 
to be considered by the court include: [1] to 
what extent a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence might be prejudicial to the 
person or those already parties; [2] the 
extent to which, by protective provisions in 
the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measures, the prejudice can be lessened 
or avoided; [3] whether a judgment rendered 
in the person's absence will be adequate; [4] 
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate 
remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 
 
 
on issue preclusion,12 a party may be precluded from relitigating 
an issue only if: 
 "(1) the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication was identical with the one 
presented in the later action; (2) there was 
a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party 
against whom the plea is asserted was a party 
or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; and (4) the party against whom 
it is asserted has had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in question 
in a prior action." 
 
 
Janney, 11 F.3d at 409 n.12 (quoting Sanders v. Sanders, 558 A.2d 
556, 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (citation omitted), allocatur 
denied, 578 A.2d 930 (Pa. 1990)).  Thus, if the landlord was in 
privity with J.P. Morgan and Widener and they adequately 
represented its interests, WALP would be collaterally estopped.  
See id. at 410.  Yet, under Rule 19(b), unlike Rule 19(a), 
collateral estoppel is only a necessary condition of dismissal, 
not a necessary and sufficient condition. 
 Though it would be logically inconsistent for J.P. 
Morgan to succeed in this federal action on its defense that no 
lease existed with respect to the tortious interference claim, 
and the landlord to lose in the state court action because the 
state court decided the parties' actions and oral communications 
brought a lease into existence, logical inconsistency does not 
                     
12.  The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law applies in 
this diversity action.  All lease negotiations occurred in 
Pennsylvania, the object of the purported lease is located there, 
and the draft leases specifically provided that the lease was to 
be governed by Pennsylvania law. 
 
 
make an absent party indispensable.  See Field v. Volkswagenwerk 
AG, 626 F.2d 293, 301-02 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he possibility of a 
subsequent adjudication that may result in a judgment that is 
inconsistent as a matter of logic [does not] trigger the 
application of Rule 19.") (emphasis added). 
 In the district court, WALP offered to agree to be 
bound by any determination of the lease issue, even if not 
joined, provided Schulman would also agree to be bound.  WALP 
specifically informed the district court that it could 
 submit an affidavit . . . in which it would 
agree to be bound by a decision rendered in 
this action as to the existence of a lease 
and would expect, in return, plaintiff's 
acknowledgement and stipulation that he would 
be bound by [the district court's] 
determination of the lease issue so that 
plaintiff would not seek to relitigate the 
issue in state court.  If WALP were to submit 
such an affidavit and plaintiff such an 
acknowledgment and stipulation, there would 
be no need to join WALP as a party defendant 
and there would be no possibility of further 
procedural wrangling in the state court on 
the lease issue. 
 
 
Letter from Leonard S. Baum, Esq., counsel for Mortgagees, to 
District Court dated February 16, 1993, Exh. "B" of Memorandum of 
Law of Appellees to this Court dated March 11, 1994.  Schulman 
declined this offer and no such affidavit or stipulation was 
filed.  We think that Schulman, even absent this stipulation, 
would be bound by the district court's resolution of the issue 
concerning existence of the lease.  Given WALP's willingness to 
 
 
be bound, any judgment rendered in WALP's absence would be 
mutually dispositive of the case. 
 
 C. 
 Because the mortgagee's counterclaim for a declaratory 
judgment on the lease's existence mirrors an essential element of 
Schulman's own claim, i.e. the existence of a lease, we do not 
think the district court abused its discretion when it concluded 
Schulman should not be able to demand WALP's presence as a 
condition of an order adjudicating the merits of the dispute over 
the lease's existence.13  Dismissal under Rule 19(b) is subject 
to a district court's discretionary analysis of equitable 
considerations, as is its decision to entertain a request for a 
declaratory judgment.  In either case we do not think the 
district court abused its discretion.  The equities favor WALP 
and the mortgagee, not Schulman, because it was Schulman who 
chose to divide this dispute between two independent forums and 
then rejected WALP's proposal to stipulate that any decision in 
the district court would be binding on both of them in the 
ongoing state court proceedings.  Accordingly, we conclude the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the merits of 
                     
13.  In addition, we think J.P. Morgan's interest in the lease 
Schulman asserts can be analogized to that of a third party 
beneficiary.  According to Wright & Miller, "[i]n cases in which 
the beneficiary is a party, the courts uniformly reject the 
argument that all of the original parties to the contract must be 
joined."  7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, 




whether J.P. Morgan's counterclaim is treated as such or as no 
more than a redundant defense to Count I of Schulman's complaint.   
It therefore follows that we also have appellate jurisdiction to 
decide the issues the parties have raised about the lease's 
existence on their merits. 
 
 IV. 
 Turning to the merits of that issue, Schulman argues 
that a valid, enforceable lease exists because he relied on 
Kelter's assurances that he would obtain one as well as the FKB 
employees' confirmed acceptance of the final draft.14  Schulman 
relies on Emerman v. Baldwin, 142 A.2d 440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).  
There, defendants orally agreed to lease a house to plaintiffs 
for two years at a specified price.  Id. at 443.  Defendants 
acknowledged the agreement as to terms by letter but in the 
letter stated the agreement was nevertheless subject to execution 
and delivery of defendants' standard lease form.  Id.  Under the 
circumstances, the court held that the minds of the parties had 
met on the essential provisions of the lease and a valid 
leasehold agreement was made because the form's provisions were 
                     
14.  The elements of intentional interference with existing 
contractual relations are:  (1) the existence of a contractual 
relationship; (2) an intent on the part of the defendant to harm 
the plaintiff by interfering with those contractual relations; 
(3) the absence of privilege or justification for the 
interference; and (4) actual damages resulting from the 
defendant's conduct.  Neish v. Beaver Newspapers, Inc., 581 A.2d 




known to plaintiffs and the defendants believed the negotiations 
had resulted in a binding contract.  Id. at 445. 
 Emerman is distinguishable from this case.  The 
defendants in Emerman expressed their willingness to accept the 
terms agreed upon during the negotiations as a binding contract 
and objectively indicated they intended the executed standard 
form would be a mere formality, serving only as evidence of the 
agreed upon terms.  In contrast, here WALP always made clear its 
intent not to be bound by any lease until a written lease was 
executed.  Paragraph 57 of the January 31, 1992, draft lease, 
which Schulman contends embodies all of the terms of the 
purported lease, expressly bars any agreement from taking effect 
until both the landlord and tenant have signed and delivered it.  
It provides in a distinctive, capitalized typeface: 
 57. Delivery For Examination.  DELIVERY OF 
THE LEASE TO TENANT SHALL NOT BIND LANDLORD 
IN ANY MANNER, AND NO LEASE OR OBLIGATIONS OF 
LANDLORD SHALL ARISE UNTIL THIS INSTRUMENT IS 
SIGNED BY BOTH LANDLORD AND TENANT AND 
DELIVERY IS MADE TO EACH. 
 
 
App. at A-150.  Schulman was on notice of WALP's intent not to be 
bound until it signed the lease throughout the negotiations.  
Schulman and his attorneys reviewed each of the four draft 
leases.  All contained this provision and they never objected to 
it.  Schulman's attorney expressly cautioned him on the necessity 
of formal execution.  Schulman concedes WALP never signed any of 
the draft leases. 
 
 
 Despite the clear language of paragraph 57, Schulman 
argues that the January 31, 1992, draft lease and the two letters 
he received from FKB employees in February 1992 create a 
sufficient writing to evidence the lease terms.  His argument 
might be sufficient to overcome the defense of the statute of 
frauds, but the issue here is whether parties whose minds had met 
on the need for a formal fully executed document before any 
binding contract arose consummated their agreement, not whether 
there was sufficient written evidence of the proposed terms of 
that agreement.  Paragraph 57 explicitly requires the signing and 
delivery of the lease itself.  The letters' references to the 
draft as a lease did not transform it into one.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, when one party has expressed an intent not to 
be bound until a written contract is executed, the parties are 
not bound until that event has occurred.  See Essner v. 
Shoemaker, 143 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1958).  In this case, no lease could 
exist until WALP executed and delivered it.15  In response to the 
mortgagee's motion for summary judgment, Schulman points to 
nothing that could create a genuine issue of fact on the 
                     
15.  Schulman argues the district court exceeded or abused its 
authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act by ruling on the 
existence of the lease.  We agree with the dissent that the 
district court could have decided this case by assuming the lease 
existed and so refusing to reach or decide the mortgagees' 
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment.  We are unable to agree, 
however, that it was inappropriate for the district court to rule 
on the counterclaim.  Resolution of the existence of a lease is 
essential to disposition of Schulman's claim of intentional 
interference with existing contractual relations.  Therefore, we 
have also considered the merits of the lease issue and concluded 
that no lease existed. 
 
 
existence of a binding lease.  For the same reasons, Schulman's 
alternate argument based on Valvano v. Galardi, 526 A.2d 1216, 
1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) that commencement of operations and 
payment of rent to WALP is part performance sufficient to take 
the case outside Pennsylvania's statute of frauds, Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 68, § 250.202 (1994), also fails.  The district court did 
not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the mortgagees 




 Schulman also asserts a claim for intentional 
interference with prospective contractual relations.16  To 
succeed, Schulman must show the prospective contract has an 
objectively reasonable probability of coming into existence.  See 
Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. 1979).  
We think there is sufficient evidence in this record to withstand 
summary judgment on the issue of whether Schulman had a 
reasonable probability of obtaining a lease from WALP absent the 
mortgagee's interference.17  We must therefore consider whether 
the mortgagee's conduct was privileged.18 
                     
16.  The elements of this tort are: (1) a prospective contractual 
relation; (2) intent to harm the plaintiff by preventing the 
relation from occurring; (3) absence of privilege or 
justification on the defendant's part; and (4) resulting damage.  
See Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 601-02 (3d Cir.) (citing 
Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. 
1979)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990). 
17.  We believe there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
there was a reasonable probability of Schulman's obtaining a 
 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has "repeatedly looked 
to the Restatement as authority for the elements of a cause of 
action for intentional interference with existing contract 
relations."  Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levins & Creskoff v. 
Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1182 n.13 (Pa. 1978) (adopting 
Restatement of Torts §§ 766, 767 as definition of intentional 
interference), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 
(1979).  It has also adopted portions of the Restatement relating 
to intentional interference with prospective contractual 
relations.  See Glenn v. Point Park College, 272 A.2d 895, 897 
(Pa. 1971).  Section 769 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
excuses interference committed by a person with a financial 
interest in another's business if that interest may be affected 
(..continued) 
lease absent the mortgagee's interference.  Although Schulman 
argues Kelter did not begin communicating his displeasure with 
Maxi's until after speaking with Pfeiffer, he conceded in 
deposition and hearing testimony in the state ejectment action 
that Kelter began complaining almost immediately after Maxi's 
opened.  That opening, in Schulman's own words, occurred "on or 
about December 2, 1991, well before the grand opening party" on 
December 12, 1991 and prior to Pfeiffer communicating her 
displeasure.  Thus, Kelter's opinion may have been uninfluenced 
by Pfeiffer.  Nevertheless, Schulman might have been able to get 
Kelter to change his mind absent the mortgagee's objections 
because Kelter initially appeared willing to work out the 
problems he noted and suggested various improvements after 
expressing his displeasure. 
18.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not adopted the language 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1977) that favors an 
analysis of "proper" conduct rather than "privileged."  Thus, in 
cases to which Pennsylvania law applies, we must consider 
privilege in analyzing claims of interference with prospective 
contractual relations.  See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 
F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
 
by commercial relations between others.  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 769 (1979).  It provides: 
 One who, having a financial interest in the 
business of a third person[,] intentionally 
causes that person not to enter into a 
prospective contractual relation with 
another, does not interfere improperly with 
the other's relation if he 
 
  (a) does not employ wrongful means and 
 
  (b) acts to protect his interest from 
being prejudiced by the relation. 
 
 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 
A.2d 611, 625 (Pa. Super. 1980) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 769 approvingly), abrogation on other grounds recognized 
by Yetter v. Ward Trucking Co., 585 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1991) (citing Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990) and 
Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989)).  
As the district court recognized, illustration 1 to that section 
is similar to this case.  Illustration 1 provides: 
 A provides the financial backing for B's 
theatrical production.  The arrangement is in 
the form of a loan for the purposes of the 
production.  While B undertakes to repay the 
loan in any event, in fact the chances of 
repayment depend upon the success of the 
play.  B is about to engage C to play the 
leading role.  Under the conditions stated in 
Clauses (a) and (b), A's interference with 
the prospective relation by causing B not to 
have C play that role is not improper. 
 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 769 cmt. c, illus. 1.  The 
interest of a mortgage lender is clearly an economic or financial 
interest that falls within the scope of the privilege.  See, 
 
 
e.g., Cloverleaf Dev., Inc. v. Horizon Fin. F.A., 500 A.2d 163, 
167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (lender acted in its own financial 
interest by demanding higher interest rate, thereby interfering 
with sale of mortgage). 
 Here, the mortgagee who is charged with interference 
loaned WALP $62 million for renovations; of that amount only 
$56,280 was allocated to Maxi's.  Schulman argues this minimal 
financial interest is insufficient to justify the mortgagee's 
conduct.  Schulman also argues the mortgagee's aesthetic concerns 
are invalid because there is no evidence Schulman could not pay 
the rent as agreed.  Schulman misses the point.  J.P. Morgan has 
$62 million tied up in the Widener Building and if the building 
doesn't succeed in attracting up-scale tenants, J.P. Morgan's 
ability to recoup its loan is jeopardized.  To the extent Maxi's 
appearance would harm the building's ability to attract first-
class tenants, J.P. Morgan's concerns are valid.  WALP implicitly 
acknowledged this by granting the mortgagee the right to 
disapprove tenants. 
 Interference is also privileged when the actor believes 
in good faith that his legally protected interest may otherwise 
be impaired by the performance of the contract. See Advent Sys., 
Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1991); Geofreeze 
Corp. v. C. Hannah Constr. Co., 588 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D. Pa. 
1984); Cloverleaf, 500 A.2d at 168.  Section 773 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts excuses interference by persons 
protecting legal interests.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773 
(1979).  It provides: 
 
 
 One who, by asserting in good faith a legally 
protected interest of his own or threatening 
in good faith to protect the interest by 
appropriate means, intentionally causes a 
third person not to perform an existing 
contract or enter into a prospective 
contractual relation with another does not 
interfere improperly with the other's 
relation if the actor believes that his 
interest may otherwise be impaired or 




Id. (emphasis added); see also Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. 
D'Ambro, 596 A.2d 867, 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (relying on 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 773); Geofreeze, 588 
F. Supp. at 1345-46 (citing section 773 approvingly).  The 
Restatement gives an actor this defense only if it has a legally 
protected interest and, in good faith, asserts the interest or 
threatens to protect it by appropriate means.  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 773 cmt. a. 
 The Mortgage and Loan Documents WALP and Widener 
executed expressly prohibit WALP from entering into any lease 
without Widener's prior written consent.  Section 6.01.1 of the 
Mortgage forbids WALP from executing leases without the 
mortgagee's written consent.  Section 9.01(k) makes WALP's sale, 
conveyance, encumbrance, or other transfer of control without the 
mortgagee's prior written consent an event of default.  Section 
10.01 again forbids transfers of any kind without the mortgagee's 
prior written consent.  WALP also covenanted in section 4(k) of 
the Assignment of Leases to Equitable Life that it would: 
 [n]ot lease any part of the Property, or 
renew or extend the term of any Lease of any 
 
 
part of the Property without, in each case, 
the prior written consent of the Assignee or 




App. at A-410.19  In the instant case, Widener acted in good 
faith pursuant to its own reserved, contractual right in the 
mortgage and loan documents between it and WALP to oversee the 
selection of the Widener Building tenants.20 
                     
19.  The only exception to the written approval requirement is 
that leases may be granted without the lender's approval if done 
"in strict accordance with the provisions of the Loan Agreement."  
App. at A-399.  The Loan Agreement exempts only those leases 
which "prior to the Closing, . . . demise[] less than 5,000 
square feet of Rentable Area and which otherwise compl[y]" with 
the other agreement provisions.  App. at A-427.  Although 
Schulman's space occupies only 1,407 square feet, he does not 
contend his lease took effect "prior to the Closing," which 
occurred on June 8, 1990. 
20.  Schulman argues Pennsylvania law does not require 
a prospective tenant to search the public records for a mortgage 
that may have restricted the landlord's right to lease the 
property in question.  Generally, under Pennsylvania law a 
mortgage, recorded or not, does not affect title to property, but 
a lessee's interest may nevertheless be subordinated to a 
mortgage, as reflected in Schulman's draft lease.  See DeMarco v. 
City of Philadelphia, 494 A.2d 875, 876 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).  
Our research has not revealed any Pennsylvania cases directly 
supporting either party's position on the issue of record notice.  
The draft leases, however, all contained a subordination clause 
putting Schulman on constructive notice of the existence of 
mortgage documents.  Schulman also knew Pfeiffer was connected 
with the lender and that she wanted to review the draft leases. 
 
    Whether notice of the mortgagee's interest and the tenant's 
express subordination to the rights of the mortgagee allow J.P. 
Morgan to proceed directly against WALP, the owner, is thus a 
question we do not decide.  It is unnecessary to resolve it 
because WALP never executed a lease and Widener clearly reserved 
its right to approve Schulman's lease and its acts to that end 
are privileged under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 773. 
 
 
 Thus, the mortgagee's conduct is not improper based on 
both its financial and legal interests in the transaction. 
 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons the order of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
 
                                    
 
ROBERT D. SCHULMAN, t/a MAXI'S EXPRESS, Appellant v. 
J.P. MORGAN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INC.; WIDENER FUNDING CORP., 




ROSENN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants on Schulman's claim for intentional 
interference with existing contractual relations.  However, I 
part company with the majority's characterization of J.P. 
Morgan's counterclaim and its decision to sustain the district 
court's ruling on the amended counterclaim involving the 
existence of a lease between Schulman and Widener Associates 
Limited Partnership (WALP).  I therefore respectfully concur and 
dissent. 
 I. 
 This is an action by Schulman against the defendants 
for intentional interference in contractual relations.  Before 
 
 
Schulman initiated this action, WALP filed an ejectment action in 
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to evict Schulman.  
That action, which was pending at the time Schulman filed this 
suit, inevitably must test the existence of a lease between the 
Schulman and WALP.  There was no point, therefore, for the 
district court to decide an issue already pending in the state 
court and which was not essential to the disposition of the 
matter before it.  In this federal action, the issue is limited 
to whether the defendants intentionally interfered with 
Schulman's contractual rights.   
 The majority concedes that the district court could 
have disposed of this case by assuming, without deciding, that 
WALP and Schulman had agreed upon the  terms of the lease.  
Moreover, as discussed by the majority in Part III, the 
defendants acted in good faith pursuant to their contractual 
rights to protect their legal interests.  Therefore, even 
assuming the existence of a lease, the defendants' actions were 
privileged and did not constitute intentional interference. 
 The district court should not have decided the question 
of whether Schulman had a valid lease to any space at the Widener 
Building because that issue was pending in the state court 
action, essentially involves a matter of state law, and the 
elements for a declaratory judgment were not present.21  The 
                     
21.  The defendants contend that this court does not have 
jurisdiction to decide whether the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment for them on their counterclaim because 
Schulman only appealed from the August 11, 1993 Order granting 
 
 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, calls for the federal 
courts to exercise discretion in determining whether to involve 
themselves in a declaratory judgment action.  As set forth most 
recently by this court in United States v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of 
Envtl. Resources, 923 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1991), this court 
considers the following factors when determining whether the 
federal forum is appropriate for a declaratory action: (1) the 
likelihood that a federal court declaration will resolve the 
uncertainty of obligation which gave rise to the controversy; (2) 
the convenience of the parties; (3) the public interest in 
settlement of the uncertainty of obligation; and (4) the 
availability of and relative convenience of other remedies.  Id. 
at 1075 (citations omitted).   
 The Pennsylvania, Dep't of Envtl. Resources court also 
discussed Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213 (3d 
Cir. 1989), in which the court upheld the district court's stay 
of an insured's claim in light of a pending state tort action 
because of the general policy of restraint when the same issues 
are pending in a state court and an avoidance of duplicative 
litigation.  923 F.2d at 1075-76; see also Brillhart v. Excess 
Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942) (federal court should consider 
(..continued) 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and not from the 
April 27, 1993, Order granting the defendants leave to amend 
their answer to include the counterclaim.  However, the August 
11, 1993 Order from which Schulman appealed specifically granted 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim 
and declared that Schulman had no legally enforceable lease. 
 
 
whether state court suit "present[s] the same issues, not 
governed by federal law, between the same parties" and whether 
state court is better able to settle controversy).  "[E]ven if a 
declaratory judgment would clarify the parties' legal rights, it 
should ordinarily not be granted unless 'the parties' plans of 
actions are likely to be affected by a declaratory judgment.'"  
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 412 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).   
 The district court's decision to resolve the 
declaratory action raised by the counterclaim substantially 
ignores these factors.  The federal action can be resolved 
without deciding the essential issue in the pending state court 
ejectment action.  There is no public interest involved in either 
action and the state action provides an available and convenient 
forum for the disposition of a contractual suit arising under 
state law.  The declaratory judgment did not serve any useful 
purpose because the declaration was not necessary for the 
settlement of obligations between the parties in this case or for 
the disposal of this action.   
 The declaration of the district court improperly 
encroaches upon the state court, which is currently addressing 
the issue of the existence of a lease between Schulman and WALP.  
The district court acknowledged that its declaration that there 
was not a valid contract between Schulman and WALP "may not 
resolve the question still pending . . . in state court regarding 
 
 
what rights Schulman has against a landlord who allegedly 
represents it can freely enter into a lease, when in fact it 
cannot."  The district court's declaration will have the effect 
of either binding the state court in its decision making or 
requiring Schulman to undertake duplicative litigation.  In any 
event, it can only serve to complicate or confuse the state court 
proceedings.  The majority's ruling on the lease is not necessary 
to this action and relies on a matter in which a key figure to 
the lease is not a party to the proceedings before this court.  
Finally, the parties would not be inconvenienced by deference to 
the state court because the federal action properly granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on Schulman's claims 
against them, and the state court could resolve in timely fashion 
the issue of the existence of a lease.  Thus, I believe this 
court should reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants on their counterclaim.   
 II. 
 Additionally, the majority's extensive discussion of 
Rule 19 is not necessary or relevant to the disposition of this 
appeal.  As the majority concedes, the district court had 
ancillary jurisdiction over the issue raised in the counterclaim 
without regard to diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (West 1993).  
(Maj. Op. at 12).  I further disagree with the majority's 
characterization of J.P. Morgan's counterclaim as a redundant 
defense.  This issue has never been raised by the parties and 
 
 
there is no indication that J.P. Morgan did not intend to file a 
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment.    
 As authority for its "relabeling" the counterclaim as a 
defense, the majority cites Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c).  Rule 8(c), 
however, empowers a trial court at the pleading stage to correct 
a party's mistaken designation of a counterclaim as a defense if 
justice so requires.  The rule does not provide any authority for 
this court to do so on appeal.  Rather, our review is constrained 
by the district court's treatment of the pleading as a 
counterclaim.  Therefore, I see no justification to relabel J.P. 
Morgan's counterclaim as a defense, and no need to discuss Rule 
19 in light of the district court's ancillary jurisdiction over 
the counterclaim. 
 Moreover, the majority concludes that the equities 
favor WALP and the defendants, and not Schulman, because Schulman 
chose to divide this dispute between two independent forums and 
then rejected WALP's proposal to stipulate that any decision in 
the district court would be binding in the state court.  (Maj. 
Op. at 19).  However, WALP, not Schulman, chose to file the 
ejectment action in the Philadelphia County Court of Common 
Pleas.  Moreover, there was no reason for Schulman to stipulate 
to a binding resolution by the district court because that court 
was not the appropriate forum for resolution of an issue 
essentially involving state law pending in a prior action 
instituted by WALP in state court.  Finally, the equities may 
 
 
fall in favor of Schulman in the ejectment action because Kelter, 
the principal acting on WALP's behalf, sought out Schulman to 
discuss plans to operate Maxi's food establishment in the lobby 
of the Widener Building.  "It is undisputed that both Kelter and 
Schulman anticipated that a lease would be executed" and Schulman 
invested $35,000 of his own money toward construction costs.  
(Maj. Op. at 5). 
 III. 
 In conclusion, the district court should not have 
decided the question presented by the defendants' counterclaim as 
to whether there was in fact a lease because the elements for a 
declaratory judgment were not present.  Furthermore, the 
declaration of the district court improperly encroaches upon the 
litigation then pending in the state court.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion. 
